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1. Introduction
During the post-war disarmament nego-
tiations between the two major powers,
one of the most intractable issues has been
that of international inspection. In general,
the Soviets have preferred a minimum of
inspection, instituted as late in each stage
as possible, while the West has pressed
for both a greater degree of inspection
and its institution as early as possible in
each stage of the complex arms reduction
process. Despite some modest progress on
principles, no concrete agreement on
specifics has yet been negotiated; even the
limited test ban treaty relies solely upon
national inspection procedures, carried on
outside one another’s borders. And while
a break in the inspection impasse would
by no means suffice for the establishment
of a meaningful arms reduction arrange-
ment, there is little doubt that it never-
theless remains a necessary precondition.1
As the negotiations have proceeded in
their atmosphere of ambivalence and
acrimony, the responsible policy-makers
and representatives have devoted consider-
able effort to persuading their opposite
numbers and their domestic publics of
the reasonableness of their respective po-
sitions. But whether the audience is
addressed across the bargaining table or
via the mass media at home, the would-be
persuaders have labored under several
serious handicaps. Of these, perhaps one
of the more crucial has been a lack of
specificity based either upon experience
or upon experiment. Even in the matter of
underground nuclear test detection, the
credibility of the experiential or experi-
mental base has been seriously reduced by
the misleading interpretations placed upor
the resultant data. It seems safe to predic
that, until a fairly reliable - and credible
- body of data becomes available, the
adversaries will debate in vain; and ever
if the adversary is persuaded, the home-
front hard-liners will still find it easy to
charge a ’sellout’.
If ex cathedra argument is to give way to
a measure of empiricism, and if very little
reliable experience is available, some sort
of experimentation would seem to be in
order. Such experimentation may take a
variety of forms, each with its peculiar
strengths and weaknesses. At the micro~
system level, for example, the investigator
might try to ascertain the effectiveness of
varied training programs by measuring
the accuracy and rapidity with which
inspection personnel can distinguish cer.
tain salient configurations or procedures;
or of the efficacy of various types of instru-
mentation for ascertaining the absence,
presence, or quality of specific chemical
or metallic substances. And at the macra
level, we might experiment with varying
inspection grid patterns in order to
appraise the thoroughness, speed, and
economy with which a surveillance team
might cover a large geographical region.
In either case, models based on theoretical
considerations are put to the test in situ-
ations as close as possible to the real
world in which the inspection system may
be expected to operate. In addition, these
experiments, may occur either in the field
or in a laboratory-type setting. The field
or factory setting has the advantage of
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greater realism, but in the laboratory one
is able to manipulate each of the key
variables with a greater degree of flexi-
bility.
As both the quantity and quality of
research on inspection for disarmament
increase, in government as well as out,
the desirability and possibility of going
into greater detail likewise increase. Just
a few short years ago, there was almost
no available unclassified literature on the
subject; the journals prior to 1960 had
carried a handful of papers and most of
these dealt with rather general problems.
Outside of the work dealing with detection
and identification of nuclear weapons
tests, the major detailed studies then avail-
able were those of Feld, Henkin, and
Melman.2 But the upsurge of serious work
on the inspection problem has now made
it mandatory that we become increasingly
specific in our research.
In the absence of actual experience in
using various inspection methods currently
available, the rational selection of a
particular method can only be based upon
their anticipated relative effectiveness in
a given range of situations. Such effective-
ness may be appraised by: 1) abstract
analysis, 2) laboratory or field experiment,
3) digital computer simulation using ab-
stract (mathematical and logical) models,
or 4) any combination of the above.
Unfortunately, too little of such ex-
perimentation has occurred, particularly
in the matter of inspecting for clandestine
production of proscribed quantities or
types of weapon or hardware.3 Given this
situation, we have attempted a modest
experiment, or computer simulation, based
on a rather simplified set of production,
evasion, and inspection models. Though
the simulation might as readily be applied
to any weapon type, we have thought in
terms of one of four possible agreements
regulating aircraft and rocket production.
In matrix form, the four possibilities might
be as follows, with a tentative ranking in
order of inspection difficulty:
The sort of ban examined in this study is
type 3, which permits unlimited produc-
tion of certain classes of airplanes and
rockets and prohibits any production of
other classes.4 Aircraft which are capable
of carrying and launching mass destruction
weapons, including stand-off missiles, are
prohibited, and the distinguishing char-
acteristics of illegal planes are assumed
to be: (a) the presence of bomb-bays, bomb
shackles, and launching-guiding equip-
ment ; and (b) the absence of pressuriza-
tion and seating provisions for passenger
craft, and loading-unloading and storage
provisions for cargo craft. As to rockets,
we assume that those designed for deliver-
ing nuclear or conventional warheads over
any range are prohibited, and that illegal
rockets are distinguishable by: (a) the
presence of ground-to-ground guidance
mechanisms, re-entry cones, and payload
fittings designed for warheads rather than
non-lethal instrumentation; and (b) the
absence of destruct mechanisms and pro-
vision for separation of instrumented
payloads. In both the airplane and rocket
category, we assume that a number of
other characteristics exist by which legal
production may be differentiated from
illegal production; the particular criteria
are, in any event, not crucial to the design
of this type of experiment.
Given these assumptions, what is the
purpose of an inspection system? Ob-
jectively speaking, it is that of reducing
(but not completely eliminating) the
probability of an evasion going undetected.
As the probability of successful evasion
goes down, two important consequences
accrue. First, the potential evader (let us
label him A) will - assuming the costs
to him of being detected are high enough
- be less motivated to evade. That is,
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a rational and amoral group of national
(or local) decision-makers will have a
temptation to evade which diminishes as
(a) probability of detection increases,
(b) costs to them of being detected in-
crease, (c) gains to them of successful
evasion decrease. Second, as the potential
evader’s (A’s) probability of successful
evasion decreases, so will the other party’s
(B ...N) belief that evasion is being at-
tempted in the first place, all other things
being equal. This tendency, in turn, will
reduce B’s temptation to evade, inasmuch
as one of the factors which increases the
temptation to evade is the fear that the
other may be gaining a strategic advantage
by engaging in clandestine evasion.
However, the efficacy of an inspection
system cannot possibly be measured solely
by the probability with which it will (or
frequency with which it does) detect
attempted evasions. Equally crucial is the
degree to which it minimizes the proba-
bility of false ’detections’. The agreement
could as readily be torn asunder by a
high number of false alarms as by a high
number of successful evasions. Thus, the
effectiveness of the system must be seen
as varying directly with the probability
of detection when evasion is occurring (correct
detection) and inversely with the prob-
ability of an alarm (false detection) when
evasion is not occurring.5
Finally, no inspection system can be
appraised purely in terms of its perform-
ance. Associated costs must be considered,
and among these, two stand out as
crucial. One is the simple item of monetary
and material costs of installing and operat-
ing the system, and this is susceptible to
relatively simple calculation. But the
other is political onerousness, and lends
itself much less readily to such appraisal
and prediction.
2. The inspection situation
Given these general assumptions re-
garding the usefulness of the type of
experiment proposed and the basic pur-
poses of a production inspection system,
let us now describe the hypothetical in-
spection situation in moderate detail.
Following that, we will move on to a
presentation of the simulation procedure.
The airframe production complex under
investigation here is assumed to be based
on four relatively distinct stages of activity:
raw material production, parts produc-
tion, sub-assembly, and final assembly.
In this study, experimental data on all
four stages were gathered, but our focus
here will be primarily upon the final
assembly stage. This stage relies upon
20 production-assembly areas with up to
20 production-assembly points in each
area, of which it is assumed that no more
than 5 will be evading the agreement
(producing proscribed airplanes or rockets)
at any one time. Further, we postulate
that when such points are engaged in
evasion they will do so during a specific
time period of h hours or d days, with a
clear break between legal and illegal
activity. Finally, since we are not con-
sidering here the inspection that would
occur along transport routes or at junc-
tions between production areas, the physi-
cal locations and distance between areas
are ignored.
As to inspection procedures, we can
assume that site visits (which may well,
of course, be supplemented by permanent
on-site inspectors, records examination,
and personnel interviewing) may occur
regularly every dth day or on the average
of every dth day. Naturally the latter
(stochastic or probabilistic) schedule is
preferable to the deterministic one, and
by using a Monte Carlo method, a random
number can be generated for each site
on each day to ascertain whether that
site is to be visited on that day.6 This is
equivalent to tossing a well-balanced d-
sided coin, of which all sides (days) but
one are marked ’no visit’. Another postu-
lated inspection characteristic is that the
probability of correctly distinguishing be-
tween legal and illegal activity increases
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as we move from the construction of sub-
units and components through various
stages of sub-assembly to the final, as-
sembled product. At stages I through 3 we
assume that the probability of a correct
or false appraisal does not change from
hour to hour or day to day; these points
produce items which always look alike.
But at stage 4, where final assembly of
the various components occurs, it makes
a considerable difference whether the
inspection team is there at the beginning
or at the end of the stage, with the prob-
ability of an accurate appraisal rising
steadily throughout that final stage. An
the probability of detection should never
reach certainty (i.e., 1.0) but when other
variables are brought to bear, such a prob-
ability is nearly attainable. Furthermore,
when all other variables are considered,
we find that probability of detection re-
mains at zero beyond maximum range,
rises slowly as that threshold is crossed,
then climbs rapidly during middle ranges,
to level off again at very close ranges.
Thus when the total complex (object,
range, weather, crew, equipment, etc.) is
considered, we get a probability-of-detec-
tion curve which looks more like the
broken line AB’C shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Probabilities of correct and false detection as final assembly stage progresses
analogy from studies of radar detection
may be helpful here. If we ignore for the
moment the efficiency of a particular radar
crew, its gear, and its search strategy, the
probability of detection of an incoming
aircraft will vary inversely with the range
to the target.7
But when the constant factor of de-
creasing range is combined with the other
variables which affect detection, the curve
takes on a more complicated shape.
Whereas, in theory, there is no range at
which detection could not occur - and
the curve therefore never reaches the zero
level - in practice there is such a range.
Likewise, again considering range alone,
The same situation may be assumed
to obtain in the matter of detecting evasion
of a weapon production ban. In the latter
case, time takes the place of distance,
but with the time conceived of in terms
of proximity to completion rather than
proximity to beginning. Moreover, our
probabilities here must be expanded to
include that of both correct detection
(when evasion is taking place) and false
detection (when evasion is not taking
place). The precise nature of the curve
which would illustrate the relationship
between progress of the final assembly
stage and the probabilities of both correct
and false detection is far from certain.
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It could follow the inverted J-curve or the
flatter S-curve. But for our purposes the
shapes of these curves are less important
than the direction, so we will settle for a
linear presentation, with the probability
of correct detection rising over time as
shown by line ABC in Figure 1, and that
of false detection falling as shown by
line ADE. Suppose the assembly process
takes SF days to complete and that the
inspection method assigned to this process
has a probability of ultimate correct de-
tection FC and a probability of false de-
tection FE. Then, on the Tth day the
probability of correct detection of an
evasion is TH and the probability of a
false detection (if the work is indeed non-
evasive) is TG. At the start of stage 4,
the probability of either correct or false
detection by an unbiased inspectorate is
.5, since ST equals zero. And at the end
of this final assembly stage, with ST equal
to SF, our probabilities are FC and FE
respectively, which are the full values
expected of the particular inspection
method, under normal conditions. Instead
of using the graph, however, these values
may be computed by use of the following
equations:
TH (prob. of correct detection at time T)
ST
_ .5 + (FG’- .5) SF
TG (prob. of false detection at time T)
ST
=.5- (.5-FE) SF
Later on in our report, such calculations
will be presented.
3. The simulation procedure
Turning now from a description of the
inspection simulation situation to the
actual procedures employed, the first point
to emphasize is that this is essentially a
semi-dynamic model. If a fully dynamic
model were being utilized, we could ac-
tually modify the values of most or all
of the inputs during any particular simu-
lated run; that is, the program would
actually pick up, process, and adapt to,
any new data turned up during the run.
A static model, on the other hand, does
little more than perform a large number
of running pre-programmed computa-
tional assignments. The model used here
falls somewhere between the static and the
dynamic. For example, no provision is
made for the inspectors rearranging their
schedules and techniques when certain
suspicion thresholds are crossed, or for
the evader altering fundamentally his pro-
duction scheme as he ascertains the nature
of inspection methods. On the other hand,
even though the inspection procedure or
evasion scheme, once instituted, do not
undergo change during a given run, the
evasion scheme need not (and does not)
necessarily commence and terminate sim-
ultaneously with the beginning and end’
of the run. Nor are there any inhibitions
on the freedom of both inspector and
evader to modify from one run to the next.
Moreover, the Monte Carlo procedure,
by producing randomized inspection re-
sults over time, simulates a degree of
interaction between the two. In practice,
of course, there must be a fair degree of
such learning and revising, but the non-
adaptive features used here do permit us
to compare the relative effectiveness of
each inspection method under varying
production systems and evasion schemes.
Had we included the adaptive features of
a fully dynamic model, the print-out re-
sults would have been largely a welter
of data emerging out of uncontrolled
variables. The alternative is either a
much more fully articulated decision
model or the introduction of human
players, with all of the attendant costs of
the former and the weaknesses of the
latter.&dquo; Our reasoning is thus reflected in
the schematic flow diagram of Figure 2
with the computer programmed either to
retain the original evasion scheme and
inspection system at the beginning of each
new run or to introduce new ones.
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Fig. 2. Schetnatic flow of simulated inspection
The Simulation 1’nputs
The next operation in designing the com-
puter simulation is that of identifying
each of the variables that will affect the
outcome of any particular inspection run.
There are three sets of variables: (a) the
production system, (b) the evasion scheme
employed by the production system, and
(c) the method used by the inspection
team in the particular run. In greater
detail :
(A) Production System
I. How many of the 20 production
areas are operating in each of the 4
production stages
2. How many of the 20 production
points are operating in each pro-
duction area
(B) Evasion Scheme
1. No, and identity of production
areas evading in each stage
2. No. and identity of evading pro-
duction points in each of above
areas
3. Starting and finishing days of
evasion in each evading stage
(C) Inspection Method
1. Average probability of correct de-
tection assumed for each run in
every stage
2. Average probability of false de-
tection assumed for each run in
every stage
3. Frequency and time pattern of
on-site inspections for each pro-
duction area
A note regarding the values assigned
to variables C-1 and C-2 is in order here.
From general experience in a wide variety
of settings (industrial quality control, medi-
cal diagnosis, law enforcement, pattern
recognition, etc.), there are certain well-
established performance ranges for specific
operations under ’normal’ conditions.9 On
the basis of these, we assign to each of
our three inspection methods the following
normal expected performance characteris-
tics :
A B C
Probability of Correct Detection .70 .80 .90
Probability of False Detection .04 .08 .12
These rough probabilities are, however,
based on hypothetical long-run conditions
of normality, and fail to take account of
momentary perturbations in the produc-
tion system, the inspection methods, and
the environment within which any par-
24
ticular inspection occurs. In order to
introduce greater realism into our simu-
lation, then, we employ a Monte Carlo
technique by which the computer gene-
rates from a set of equi-probable numbers,
such random numbers as to reflect the
inevitable short-run fluctuations in the
inspection process; they are used to modify
(up or down) the assumed normal prob-
abilities of correct and false detections
in any given run.
The Inspection Process
Once the various inputs have been de-
cided upon, and appropriate values as-
signed or calculated, the program pro-
ceeds as follows. (See Figure 2 and
Figure 5 for the simplified and the detailed
flow diagrams, respectively.) Using an
IBM 7090 and a program written in
MAD (Michigan Algorithm Decoder)
with approximately I,000 contingent in-
structions, we execute the following steps.
For each run, values are assigned as above,
with the computer instructed as to which
production system is being utilized, where
and when evasions are actually occurring
in that production system, and which
inspection techniques to employ. For each
of the 400 iterations, we modified each
set of inputs, so that almost all conceivable
combinations of conditions could be ex-
perienced, but as Tables 1 and 2 indicate,
only a small sample of our data is reported
here.
During the simulation runs covering
stages 1 through 3, the following calcu-
lations were made. For each evading pro-
duction point, a random number (Ri), in
the interval 0 to 1, is generated by the com-
puter and then compared to the modifica-
tion of the probability of correct detection
(PI) inherent in the particular inspection
method used in that run. If Pl turns out
to be greater than or equal to RI, the
evasion has been correctly detected, but
if P, is less than the generated value RI,
the evasion has gone undetected.l° For
each non-evading production point, another
random number (R2) in the interval 0 to I
is generated and then compared, as in
the evading situation, with the modified
probability of false detection (P2) applic-
able to the particular inspection method
utilized in that inspection run. If R2 turns
out to exceed P2, the run is said to have
correctly observed that no evasion was
occurring, but if R2 is equal to or less than
P2, a false detection is recorded.
In stage 4, as suggested earlier, the com-
putations are more complex. Here we
have to account for the number of days
which this final assembly stage requires
and for the number still remaining when
the inspection occurs. Using the equation
discussed earlier (in connection with Fig. 1)
we calculate P3, the modified probability
of correct detection at the end of day T
of a production point which is evading:
where
P3 - modified probability of correct de-
tection on inspection date (time T)
T - present date (of inspection visit)
P, - probability of correct detection at
time T f
T f - date on which this assembly finishes
T, - date on which this assembly starts.
Once P3 is calculated, a third random
number (R3) in the interval 0 to 1 is
generated, and the two are compared.
If P3 turns out to be equal to or greater
than R3, the evasion has been correctly
detected, but if P3 is less than R3, it has
gone undetected.
For a non-evading production point in
stage 4, we first calculate P,, the modified
probability of a false detection at the end
of day T:
where
P4 - modified probability of false de-
tection on inspection date (time T)
T - present date (of inspection visit)
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Pf - probability of false detection at
time T j.
T f - date on which this assembly fin-
ishes
T, - date on which this assembly starts.
Once P4 is calculated, a random number
(R4) in the interval 0 to I is generated,
and the two are compared. If R, turns
out to exceed P4, the inspection run is said
to have correctly observed that no evasion
was occurring, but if R4 is equal to or less
than P4, a false detection is recorded.
The Simulation Output
As each run of the varying inputs proceeds
through the simulated inspection process,
and the multiple calculations are com-
pleted, the computer reads out a wide
range of inspection performance results.
These outputs initially take two forms:
internal information and external informa-
tion. The external information is equiva-
lent to the inspectorate’s report: which
areas and points in each of the first three
stages are believed to be engaging in illegal
production or assembly activities. In addi-
tion, for stage 4 (final assembly) the report
indicates the point of progress between
start and finish at which evasion is alleged
to have occurred.
This external information report is then
checked by the computer against the in-
ternal information: which areas and
points had, indeed, been engaged in
illegal activity. In evaluating the inspec-
torate’s report, it prints out the distribu-
tion of correct detections where evasion
had in fact been taking place, and false
detections for all the non-evading, but
suspected, areas and points. At the close
Table 1. Percentage of correct and false detections in exact numbers : five evasion schemes vs. three inspection
methods during 400 inspection visits
26
of a particular 400-day run, average values
for correct and false detections are com-
puted and printed out, providing the
experimenters with the data by which the
performance of each inspection method
vis-d-vis each evasion scheme may be ap-
praised.
4. Simulation result
In Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 3 and 4,
we present a small part of the output
generated in the 18 experiments of 400 days
each - or 7,200 simulated daily inspection
visits representing about 3 hours of IBM
7090 computer time. The Table indicates
the performance of our three different
inspection methods when pitted against
five different evasion schemes (classified by
number of production points evading
during the run). On the left-hand side
of Table 1, we see the frequencies with
which each inspection method correctly
detected precisely the number of points
listed when the number actually evading
ranged from I to 5. To illustrate, when 4
points were evading, method A detected
3 (and only 3) of them 42.2 per cent of the
time and all 4 of them only 24 per cent
of the time; and when 5 were evading,
method C detected exactly 4 of them only
29.8 per cent of the time, but detected
all 5 on 60.2 per cent of the occasions.
These data are not, however, of much
interest to the designers of an inspection
system as they stand. Their usefulness only
becomes apparent when we look at thresh-
old results, i.e. the minimum number of
correct detections or the maximum number
of false detections. In other words, we
do not care much if method A, when con-
Table 2. Percentage of correct and, false detections above and below various thresholds : five evasion schemes vs.
three inspection methods during 400 inspection visits
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Fig. 3. Frequency distribution curves for correct
detection - five evading points inspected by three
methods
fronted with five evading points (to take
one of the examples illustrated on the left-
hand side of Table 1 ) detects 4, and only 4,
of the 5 points with a frequency of 35.2
per cent. But we do care that this inspec-
tion method in this evasion case detects
4 or more (4 or 5) of the 5 points with a
frequency of 35.2+17.8, or 53.0 per cent
of the time, as shown in Table 2. Thus,
in order to ascertain the simulated perform-
ance of a given method, we add together
all the specific frequencies of correct de-
tection (shown in Table 1) at and above
the performance we desire, in order to
obtain the results shown in Table 2 and
Figures 3 and 4. The lower the perform-
ance we can accept in designing an in-
spection method, the further up the col-
Fig. 4. Frequency distribution curves for false detec-
tion - five non-evading points inspected by three<!oak - y~M K-~ ~n j&OM~ z j~cc~ ~ ~rec
methods
umn we go and the higher we find the
frequency of correct detection of that
number or more to be. Using this same illus-
tration (Table 2 and Figure 3) once again,
we note that method C detected correctly
all 5 of the 5 evading points on 60.2 per
cent of the occasions, detected 4 or 5
of them 90.0 per cent of the time, and 3
or 4 or 5 of them 99.0 per cent of the time.
Turning to the equally important matter
of performance in avoiding false detections,
we apply the same procedure, but in re-
verse. That is, when method B was con-
fronted with 3 evading points in a given
production area, it did not make a single
false detection on 87.2 of its inspection
visits, and it made 1 or less ( no more than
1 ) on 98.7 of its iterations.
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5. Evaluating inspection methods
Having summarized the results of a
small portion of our 7,200 simulated in-
spections, let us now look somewhat more
closely at the relative efficacy of the three
methods employed, bearing in mind the
significance not only of correct detection,
but of false detection and the general
political costs of overintrusiveness. For




Probability of correct detection .70 .80 .90
Probability of false detection .04 .08 .12
In Table 2, covering a typical 400-day
run of inspection and evasion activity,
certain sharp distinctions are evident.
For example, when only 1 of the produc-
tion points was engaged in illegal activity,
method C did better (89.2 per cent de-
tections) than either A (68.5) or B (80.8)
in correctly detecting that evasion, as might
be expected from its normal capabilities;
but, also as expected, it revealed the lowest
capacity to avoid false alarms, reporting no
false detections in only 61.0 per cent of the
time, whereas A and B completely avoided
false detections 85.2 and 72.7 per cent of
the time, respectively. Or, when 4 points
were evading, method C surpassed A and
B in detecting all of them and in detecting
any portion of them, but also exceeded
them in false detection frequencies. And
when 2 production points were evading
(and 3 were therefore not evading), meth-
ods A and B never generated (always
avoided) more than 1 false detection
whereas method C occasionally produced
2 false detections. In general, then, because
of the greater capability (reflecting equip-
ment, personnel, training, access, etc.)
designed into method C, its average per-
formance is better in detection but worse
in terms of false detection rates, as clearly
evidenced in Table 2.
This generalization leads, then, to a
final concern for inspection system design:
what trade-offs are possible between high
detection rate and low false-alarm rate ?
Bearing in mind the oft-repeated reminder
that a ’foolproof’ inspection system may
be either technologically impossible to
build or so expensive in fiscal or,in political
terms as to be unnegotiable, we might look
briefly at the relative efficiency of these
three methods at the sub-perfect levels.ll
For example (Table 2), if we were willing
to accept a threshold of detection which
correctly identifies 1 out of 2 evading
points, methods A and B might begin to
look more attractive. That is, the dis-
crepancy between B’s and C’s perform-
ance is considerably lower at the 1-out-of-~
level than it is at the 2-out-of-2 level, and in
return for that remaining (but diminished)
inferiority, we get 100 per cent ability
to avoid any crossing of the 2-or-less false
alarm threshold, a slightly higher ability
to stay at the 1-or-under level, and an even
greater ability to avoid false alarms en-
tirely. Moving up to a more ambitious
evasion scheme, with 3 of the points in
a given production area engaged in illegal
activity, we find that methods B and C
detected at least 1 of the evasions more
than 99 per cent of the time, that B detected
2 or more on 91 per cent of its occasions
(compared to 96.7 per cent for C) and
that A produced fewer false alarms than
C or B.
Methods similar to A and B have much
to commend them. If an inspection system
is realistically designed, it will avoid two
dangers. First, it will not convert a single
detected violation into a major crisis for
the signatory governments or the inspec-
tion or enforcement agencies, but will
recognize the large number of factors that
can produce either an unintended viola-
tion or a false alarm; cumulative evidence
rather than isolated clues must provide
the basis for response. Second, and in the
same vein, it is by no means necessary to
’get all the goods’ on an intentional viola-
tor ; cumulative evidence of continued
and widespread violation should certainly
suffice, even though there may have been
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more violations than were detected. Given
these two considerations alone, it seems
perfectly reasonable to design and institute
an inspection arrangement which reduces
the probability of dangerous false alarms
and at the same time offers a high prob-
ability (not a certainty) of detecting most
(not all) violations.
We shall now turn more systematically
to the problem of evaluating inspection
methods. Using the data shown in Tables
I and 2, we suggest here two possible, and
relatively simple, ways of calculating the
relative efficacy of such alternative methods
as may be available. One is a performance-
only approach and the other is a cost-
computation approach.
6. A performance-only selection
Perhaps the most simple means of
arriving at a quick, and necessarily ten-
tative, decision as to which inspection
method to use is that of selecting more or
less intuitively acceptable minimum per-
formance thresholds for both correct de-
tection and false detection, and then
ascertaining which methods meet these re-
quirements under experimental conditions.
In Figures 3 and 4 we have plotted fre-
quency polygons from the data in Table 2.
Each point on the polygons shown in Figure
3 represents the frequency with which
that particular inspection method cor-
rectly detected (out of the five evading
units) at least the number of units shown
on the horizontal axis. Likewise, each
point on Figure 4, which represents the
inspection of 5 non-evading units, indicates
the frequency of falsely detecting the max-
imum number of units shown on the hori-
zontal axis.
Since we have here data with 5 evading
and 5 non-evading units - a total of ten
units - we shall illustrate a case for a
performance-only selection involving a
plant producing 10 units or airframes daily,
of which half are evading. To deal with
a case with different numbers of evading
and non-evading units, we merely con-
struct the two graphs for those specific
numbers, using the data from Tables 1
and 2.
Using the graphs in Figures 3 and 4,
let us suppose that our minimum require-
ments for an inspection method are these:
1 ) the inspection method must correctly
detect, 85 per cent of the time, at least 3 of
the evading units when 5 of the 10 units are
actually engaged in evasive activity, and
2) the number of falsely detected units
among the 5 non-evading units should not
exceed 1 at least 90 per cent of the time.
To find the point of threshold for the first
(correct detection) requirement in Figure
3 we draw a horizontal line from the 85 per
cent point on the vertical (performance)
axis and a vertical line up from the 3 point
on the horizontal (minimum number of
detections) axis and obtain a point of inter-
section, E. Since point E indicates the
minimum acceptable performance, any
inspection methods whose polygons lie
either on or above this point are accept-
able. A glance shows that methods B and
C satisfy this requirement. In order to find
the point of threshold for the second of the
above criteria (false detection), we draw,
on the graph in Figure 4, a horizontal line
from the 90 per cent point on the vertical
axis and a vertical line from the 1 point on
the horizontal axis and obtain a point of
intersection, F. Point F indicates the maxi-
mum acceptable level of false detection,
and any inspection methods whose polygons
lie either on or below this point are accept-
able. We find that methods A and B meet
this requirement. Thus, methods B and
C meet the criterion for correct detection
and methods A and B meet those for , false
detection. Since method B is the only
one to satisfy both criteria, we select this
inspection method.
One of the main weaknesses of this
selection method lies in specifying, as the
case for examination, only the single
combination of 5 evading and 5 non-
evading units, whereas we may obtain
from 10 inspection units up to 11 possible
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combinations of evading and non-evading
units; these combinations have either no
evading point or from I to 10 evading
points. Another weakness is that it does
not take into consideration any of the
factors related to costs of installing and
maintaining the inspection system, factors
which would become crucial if more than
one method satisfied the initial criteria.
Thus, we now turn to a somewhat more
elaborate mode of selection.
7. Selection by cost comparison
As we suggested above, any serious
scheme for comparing and evaluating
alternative inspection methods must not
only consider the per, formance of each
method, it must also consider such elusive
factors as political acceptability and in-
trusiveness as well as the costs of equip-
ment, personnel, and maintenance.12 In
this section, employing the central notion
of efficiency, we propose a technique by
which the latter of these considerations
may be meaningfully combined with per-
formance by using a single measuring
unit.
Basically, we have two logical choices
when confronted with the need to select
an inspection method. Either (a) we can
specify the minimum acceptable perform-
ance level (as in the previous section) and
then ascertain which of the available
methods meeting or exceeding that level
is least costly, or (b) we can specify the
maximum monetary cost we are willing
to sustain and then ascertain which of the
methods remaining below that ceiling is
likely to give us the highest performance
in terms of correct and false detection.
Each individual approach has its merits,
but here we seek to combine the two in
such a fashion as to express both criteria
by use of a single index. Our first step is
to postulate a range of alternative evasion
schemes, each characterized by the prob-
ability of a given combination of evading
and non-evading units; the identity of
these units is not, however, material.
Using these probabilities, the performance
values of each inspection method (such
as shown in Table 1) and costs, we may
compute the expected total cost of the
method through a formula of mathematical
expectation. Given this selection strategy,
our next problem is to develop a procedure
by which such readily estimable material
costs as initial installation and daily
maintenance of the inspection system may
be combined with a variety of non-material,
political and psychological costs into a
quantitative index; for this index we will
use a hypothetical ’dollar’. Among those
costs that will need to be calculated in
such dollar terms are (a) the failure to
detect actual evasion, and (b) the regis-
tering of false detections. For example,
if the inspection system were to fail in
detecting evasion at certain points or
stages, such failure must be compensated
for at other stages or points in order to
remain politically acceptable. Such ’beefing
up’ of the system at these points costs
money. Or if one signatory were not con-
fident of the system’s performance at one
production stage or another, it might well
be expected to increase its expenditures
for certain non-proscribed weapons (in-
cluding perhaps passive defense measures)
as a matter of insurance against possible
military disadvantage.
On the other hand, false detections are
likely to create resentments on the part
of the offended signatory, producing a
drop in his cooperation with the inspec-
torate. As obstacles and roadblocks are
put in the path of the inspection system,
a greater investment will be necessary in
order to restore the originally-sought per-
formance levels and to compensate for
the inevitable sabotage of the system. At
the extreme, a continuous barrage of false
detections could lead to unilateral abroga-
tion of the agreement, the costs of which
cannot fail to be impressive. Despite the
difficulty of converting these considera-
tions into our single monetary index, it
seems to be worth the effort.
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8. Formulation of inspection costs
In the previous section, we proposed
considering the total cost of an inspection
method as composed of four variables:
initial installation, maintenance and opera-
tion, failure to detect evasion (i.e. success-
ful evasion), and false detection. Let us dis-
cuss each briefly in turn.
The initial cost (CINI) represents the ori-
ginal, fixed investment in surveillance
equipment, buildings, transport facilities,
data processing machinery, clerical ma-
terials, and basic personnel. We assume
that none of this investment can be re-
covered at the end of an inspection period.
For maintaining and operating the system,
regular expenditure on material and per-
sonnel is essential. This operating cost
(cop) is assumed to be a linear function
of the number of days, ~I~f, constituting the
inspection period; thus total operating
cost (TCOP) is:
TCOP = COP · M ( 1 )
If we denote the total cost of successful
evasion by TCSUCEVA and that of false
detection by TCFALDET, the total cost of
the entire inspection system, being denoted
by TC’, is:
TC =
CINI + TCOP + TCSUCEVA + TCFALDET (2)
In the following section, we shall elaborate
these mal-performance costs of TcsucEVA
and TCFALDET, assuming that these costs
are directly proportional to the numbers
of successful evasions and false detections,
respectively.13
The effectiveness of an inspection system
is governed by the specific conditions un-
der which it operates: the total number of
production units per day (assumed to be
constant) and the number among this total
that are illegal. If we assume a production
total of N per day, then there are N-~-1 1
possible evasion conditions, ranging from
zero through N. For each of these condi-
tions, we assume a probability of evasion
(PEVA¡) where i is the number of illegal
units (I = 0, l, 2, ..., N). Since there are
M days in a given inspection period, the
expected number of days (D) in which the
condition with i illegal units occurs can
be represented by the following:
Next, we determine the effectiveness of
an inspection system on a day when i units
among the total of N units are evading.
In this case, the system might not detect
any evading units or it might detect any-
where from one to as many as all of the
evading units. Let us use PDET~ j to denote
the probability of detecting exactly j units
( j =1, 2, ..., i) out of i evading units by
this inspection system. Then, the expected
number of evading units correctly detected
under this condition (denoted by CORDET i)
is the following sum:
The expected number of units which
have successfully evaded among the total
of all i illegal units (SUCEVAI) is obtained
by subtracting the above number, CORDETI,
from the total number of evading units:
Since the expected number of days
having i evasions during the period is D ~ i
and the expected number of the illegal
units that have successfully evaded in any
of these days is SUCEVAI, the total ex-
pected number of successful evasions dur-
ing the entire period is the product
Di - SUCEVA, or M - PEVAI - SUCEVAI. There-
fore, if csuCEVA represents the cost of
having one successful evasion, then the
total cost of successful evasion during the
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period is the following, combining the
costs for all i (i=1, 2, ..., N) :
Let us now turn to a calculation of the
total cost of false detection. If PFALDET, j
denotes the probability of falsely detecting
exactly j units (j=l, ..., i) out of the total
of 1 legal units, then the expected number
of falsely detected units is given by the
following:
Since PEvAi represents the probability
of having exactly i evading units among
the total of N points observed a day, the
probability of having exactly i legal (non-
evading) units is PEV AN - i’ Therefore, the
product of ~.r ~ PEVAN-I t represents the
expected number of days in the period
in each of which exactly i legal units
occur. If we let CFALDET be the cost of
each false detection, then following the
same method used to obtain TCSUCEVA,
we may write the total cost of false de-
tection, being denoted by TCFALDET, as
follows:
Substituting the right-hand side of Eq.
( 1 ) and those of Eqs. (6) and (8) into
TCOP, TCSUCEVA and TCFALDET of Eq. (2),
respectively, we obtain the following final
form of the total cost of our inspection
system:
9. Illustrations
In attempting to illustrate the cost
effectiveness approach developed here, we
have at least two options. In one case, we
can assume that: (a) within any day’s pro-
duction, all units in either of the evading
and non-evading groups are homogeneous,
i.e. have an identical appearance, and (b)
the size of the group has no effect on the
performance of the selected inspection
method. In this case, we can treat PCORDET
and PFALDET as binomial distributions,
and in the Appendix the appropriate cal-
culations for FALDET and sUCEVA are
presented. In the second option, and the
one selected here, we seek greater realism;
i.e. assume lack of homogeneity and
assume that the size of either of the evading
and non-evading groups does indeed
affect performance. Let us turn, then, to
the illustration, in which the three in-
spection methods utilized in the original
simulation are evaluated. It will be re-
called that a total of five units per day
were being produced and inspected, that
anywhere from zero to five might be evad-
ing, and that the performance data in
Table 1 show the frequencies with which
each inspection method detected each
specific possible number of evasions. Fur-
ther, we postulate the following (purely
hypothetical) initial costs and daily operat-
ing costs for a typical airframe installation:
For this illustration, we use an inspec-
tion period made up of 360 days. Our
two hypothetical evasion schemes are as
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follows: in scheme I, there are 5 phases
of 72 days each; beginning with only 1
evasion in the first phase, this scheme adds
an additional evasion at the beginning
of each phase, so that there are 5 illegal
units during the final (5th) 72-day phase.
In scheme II, there are 4 phases of 90 days
each; in the first phase there are 3 illegal
units, in the second phase there are 2,
in the third phase I, and in the final
(fourth) phase there are none. Of course,
the sequence in which these evasions occur
is of no consequence; what does matter
is the distribution of daily evasion rates.
Moreover, the evader would be unlikely
to follow so simple a scheme and would
probably scatter his evasion phases into
discontinuous periods. Our calculation
assumes such discontinuity of phases, but
for purposes of clarity we present the eva-
sion schemes as follows:
Postulating that the policy-makers have
estimated that the dollar equivalent of
failing to detect (i.e. successful evasion)
is $20,000 per successful evasion and
that of false detections is $30,000 per
accusation - bearing in mind the previous
footnote - we may now go ahead and
calculate the various costs. First, however,
it is necessary to ascertain the total ex-
pected number of successful evasions and
false detections during the entire period
for each method. For the total expected
number of successful evasions (employing
method A in this illustration) we return
to the total evasion cost equation, Eq. (6),
but eliminate the multiplier, CSUCEVA,
which is the cost of a successful evasion:
Total Expected No. of Successful Eva-
sions
Using Eq. (8) in a similar manner as
we did with Eq. (6), we now obtain the
expected number of falsely-detected non-
evading units for method A:
Total Expected No. of False Detections
Likewise, we can compute the total
expected number of both successful eva-
sions and false detections for methods B
and C; they are 217.15 and 55.15 for B
and 112.32 and 83.66 for C. Using these
six values, we may now compute the total
cost of all three methods, by combining
all of our values as follows:
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Cost Comparison
(In thousands of dollars)
Examining the results of these calcula-
tions, it would seem that, if one considers
the four sets of variables indicated, method
C is the least costly. Though C’s costs for
false detection (because its performance
level is lower than those of the other two
on this score) is highest, that figure is more
than compensated for by its lower cost
on the successful evasion, initial installa-
tion, and operating dimensions. Naturally,
the dollar value arbitrarily assigned to
successful evasions and false detections is
essentially a political and military decision,
and some policy-makers might well feel
that the cost of a successful evasion ought
to be rated much higher, that of false
detection much lower, or vice versa.
Let us now apply the same procedure
to evasion scheme II, as a further illustra-
tion of this procedure. In this scheme, it
will be recalled, the evader begins with 3
illegal units per day; at the end of each
of the four 90-day phases in this scheme,
he converts one unit back to a legal one,
so that in the fourth and final phase, there
are no evasions. Employing the same
computations as in evasion scheme I, we
discover that the total cost of our three
inspection methods are as follows: A-
$8,541,000, B - $8,708,000, and C -
$8,800,000.
Under this evasion scheme, method A
offers the lowest cost of the three, although
the differences between these three in-
spection methods are not as significant as
those encountered when dealing with the
previous scheme. The point in offering
these two separate illustrations is to em-
phasize the need to calculate the cost of
each inspection method when played off
against a variety of evasion schemes. More-
over, in the event of such a production
control agreement ever being consum-
mated, it should be clear that evasion
schemes of a far more ingenious and ela-
borate nature must be anticipated, if for
no other reason that to reassure the do-




Let Pc denote the probability of correct
detection with regard to a single inspection
unit and Pe (i, j) the probability of j
successful evasions among the total of i
evasions. Then, the binomial distribution
for P, (i, j) is written as follows:
Therefore, in this case the expected num-
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Fig. 5. Detailed descriptive flow of computer simulation
ber of successful evasions (SUGF-VAi) given
by Eq. (5) is replaced by the following
equation:
This equation is changed as follows:
Thus, we have:
SUCEV Ai = 2 ~ 1 - p J
Calculating false detections
Likewise, if Pf denotes the probability of
false detection with regard to a single unit,
the binomial distribution for the proba-
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bility of j false detections out of i non-
evading units, being denoted by Pf(i, j),
is as follows:
And the expected number of falsely de-
tected points (FALDETI) in this case is
Following the method used for obtaining
the final form of SUCEVAI, the above equa-
tion can be changed to
FALDET i = ip ¡
Thus, when the probabilities‘ of correct
and false detections are binomially distri-
buted, sucEvA, and FALDETI are represen-
ted by very simple forms using i, Pc and p f.
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SUMMARY
We have tried to present an experiment in the detection of illegal weapons production,
using a rather modest and simplified computer simulation. Three inspection schemes
are defined by their ability to detect evasion and to avoid false alarms, and their effects
are simulated using Monte Carlo methods. Because the model is not a fully dynamic one,
it employs delayed rather than more or less instantaneous feedback; the full intensity
of the inspection-evasion interaction is moderated. Furthermore, the model makes a
number of assumptions which are justified only in so preliminary an analysis. For simu-
lation techniques such as that presented here to play a really useful role in the design
of inspection systems and exercise a practical effect on the negotiations for disarma-
ment, this pilot project must be considerably surpassed in complexity and sophistication.
Proceeding on the basis of data gathered during the computer simulation, we out-
lined a sequence of procedures whereby the potential signatories to a weapons produc-
tion ban agreement might be able to sort out and compare the relative costs of alterna-
tive inspection systems outlined. We have quite consciously sought to combine such
disparate material and strategic-political factors as installation and operating cost on
the one hand and successful evasion or false detection cost on the other. Two caveats
are thus in order. First, such ’combining of utilities’ may be a perfectly reasonable
procedure, but we cannot afford to forget that certain of our inputs are based on
political judgements of a most crucial sort. Second, and equally important, the calcula-
tions suggested here incorporate only a small portion of all the variables that must be
considered in selecting a man-machine inspection system upon which a nation’s security
may well depend.
